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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN NEW YORK AND CALIFORNIA:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
PAUL CZARNOTA*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of publicity is a proprietary right, which enables ce-
lebrities to prevent or control unauthorized uses of their identity
for advantage. It is recognized that there is a commercial value that
attaches to celebrity status, which is often evoked through endorse-
ment contracts for goods or services. Through endorsement, the
goodwill associated with the celebrity attaches to the good or ser-
vice, resulting in an elevated consumer appeal in that good or
service.
Celebrities earn a significant proportion of their income from
the right to enter into endorsement contracts. However, corpora-
tions commonly attempt to appropriate a celebrity's identity to ob-
tain a commercial advantage over competitors through clever
advertising strategies, without paying an endorsement fee to the ce-
lebrity. Under the right of publicity, use of a celebrity's identity in
advertising or trade without his or her consent constitutes the tort
of unfair competition.
California and New York, commonly viewed as the entertain-
ment capitals of the United States, adopt strikingly different ap-
proaches to the right of publicity. New York law prevents any
unauthorized uses of a celebrity's name, portrait, picture or voice
for advertising or trade purposes, and does not recognize a right of
publicity at common law. However, as a result of several decisions
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, California recognizes a right
of publicity under statute and common law, the latter preventing
unauthorized uses of any identifiable aspects of a celebrity's
identity.
* Barrister & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia, and the
High Court of Australia; BCom/LLB (Hons), Monash University; Current LLM
candidate, University of Melbourne. This article is a revised version of a minor
thesis prepared for the Master of Laws subject, 'Entertainment Law.' The author
would like to thank Professor David Caudill and Professor Megan Richardson for
their feedback in respect of the minor thesis. The author would also like to thank
his partner Amanda, mother Angela, father Tony, sister Gaby and brother-in-law
Ben, for their personal support throughout the years.
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This paper proposes that, to prevent free-riding on the celeb-
rity's associated commercial value, and in recognition of the eco-
nomic and social importance of the entertainment industries in
those two states, the current state of New York law is inadequate.
Consequently, efforts should be made, either legislatively or by revi-
siting the common law position, to adopt the approach taken in
California.
II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICTIY
The right of publicity is a personal property right to "own, pro-
tect, and profit from one's name, likeness, voice, or identity" or "to
control the commercial use of his or her identity."' Unauthorized
use of a person's identity is a tort, constituting an infringement of
his or her right of publicity. 2 The right of publicity affords every
person the right to assign or prevent the use of his or her identity
for commercial purposes, such as endorsing a corporation's goods
or services, or preventing unauthorized broadcasts of a person's act
or performance.3
Protection of publicity rights is extended to all persons.4 In
practice, however, only celebrities posses sufficient commercial
value in their identity to justify litigation.5 In any event, appropria-
1. Aaron A Bartz, . . . And Where it Stops, Nobody Knows: California's Expansive
Publicity Rights Threaten the Federal Copyright System, 27 Sw. U. L. REv. 299, 302 (1997)
(defining right to publicity); seeJ. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PuBLIrY
AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining commercialization of individual).
2. See McCARTHY, supra note I (discussing cause of action for infringement of
right of publicity); Lindsay C. Hanifan, Paris Hilton Avoids Getting Slapped: The Appli-
cation of California's Anti-Slapp Statute to a Right of Publicity Claim in Hilton v. Hall-
mark Cards, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 289, 295-300 (outlining history of right of
publicity).
3. SeeJ. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right
ofPublicity, 19 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 129, 130 (1995) (describing limitations and
purpose of right); see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-79
(1977) (determining First and Fourteenth Amendments do not automatically priv-
ilege press to "human cannon ball" performance). However, as McCarthy noted,
these cases tend to be rare. See McCarthy, supra at 133 (noting infrequency of such
cases).
4. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 134 (citing Eagle's Eye, Inc. v. Ambler Fash-
ion Shop, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 856, 862 (E.D. Pa 1985)) (providing authority for
proposition that "right of publicity" affords protection to natural persons and
"does not protect 'persona' of corporation").
5. See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent
Right Protecting the Associative Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 853, 854, 856-57
(1995) (discussing commercial value of celebrity personality); Sara J. Crasson, The
Limited Protections of Intellectual Property Law for the Variety Arts: Protecting Zacchini,
Houdini, and Cirque Du Soleil, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 105 (2012) ("[F]ew
variety artists have approached Vanna White's level of celebrity or notoriety, so it is
unlikely many would receive her level of protection" under right of publicity).
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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tions of a non-celebrity's identity are unlikely, due to the lack of
commercial value attaching to such a person's identity.6 For these
reasons this paper will focus on the celebrity's right of publicity.
A. Right of Publicity and Free Speech
There are many ways in which a celebrity's identity may be di-
rectly or indirectly used. For example, a restaurateur may name a
restaurant after a famous actor, a t-shirt manufacturer may sell t-
shirts which display photographs or likenesses of a celebrity, a news-
paper may sell posters commemorating an athlete's sporting per-
formance, a car manufacturer may employ a musician to sound like
a famous singer in an advertisement, or an electronics company
may employ a robot in an advertisement which resembles the char-
acteristics of a celebrity.7
While the right of publicity protects against unauthorized uses
of identity, the right does not protect against each and every poten-
tial use. Some uses may be protected under the First Amendment
right of free speech." Professor Caudill identified four categories
under which a celebrity's identity may be used.9 The first category
comprises advertising or trade purposes, which may include trading
6. See Bartz, supra note 1, at 300 (discussing increased interest in right of pub-
licity due to prevalence of celebrities promoting products). An example given by
Bartz involves an advertiser, or by extension, a manufacturer of goods or services,
seeking to augment consumer value of its product by identifying an alignment with
a celebrity through advertising. See id. (noting popularity of public figures in ad-
vertising market). Cf Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 451
(N.Y. 1902) (holding individual does not have right to prohibit all distasteful pub-
licity). In Roberson, the plaintiff was a non-celebrity who sought damages for the
allegedly unauthorized "obtain [ing]," "printting]," and "circulat[ing]" of 25,000
lithographic prints of her person. Id. It should be noted, however, that in this
case, the plaintiff was seeking protection pursuant to the Warren and Brandeis
formulation of the common law right of privacy, due to the plaintiffs alleged hu-
miliation "by the scoffs and jeers of persons," and was therefore not claiming dam-
ages for violation of her publicity rights. Id. at 44243.
7. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing claim
against restaurant); Comedy III Prods., Inc v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809
(9th Cir. 2001) (discussing claim regarding celebrity representation on T-shirts);
Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1995)
(discussing claim against newspaper); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461-
62 (9th Cir. 1988) (regarding car advertiser using musician to impersonate famous
singer); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)
(concerning robot mimicking famous individual).
8. See David Tan, Beyond Trademark Law: What the Right of Publicity can Learnfrom Cultural Studies, 25 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 913, 924-25 (2008) (finding
some uses of identity protected under First Amendment).
9. See David S. Caudill, Once More into the Breach: Contrasting US and Australian
"Rights of Publicity", 9 MEDIA & ARTs L. REv. 263, 264-65 (2004) (presenting four
categories of proper use of celebrity identity).
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on the associative value of a celebrity, or conveying celebrity en-
dorsement.10 The second category includes literal or conventional
representations of celebrities, such as when a celebrity is featured in
a photograph, painting, or on clothing or merchandise." The
third category involves transformative and creative representations
of celebrities.' 2 The fourth category consists of use of a celebrity's
identity in public interest matters, including news reporting, en-
tertainment parody and satire, and biographies.' 3
As a general rule, the right of publicity affords a celebrity the
right to prevent or control unauthorized uses of his or her identity
which fall within categories one or two, but not categories three or
four.14 Where an unauthorized use of a celebrity's identity falls on
the borderline, the public interest is said to prevail over the right of
publicity, and whether an authorized use falls within a particular
category is often a matter of judicial discretion. 15 This paper will
10. See id. (providing examples of proper use of celebrity identity for advertis-
ing or trade purposes).
11. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d
Cir. 1953) (discussing proper use of photographs); see ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g.,
Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 924-25 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J. dissenting) (explaining paint-
ings as proper use); see Comedy III Productions, Inc., 21 P.3d at 801-02, 809 (finding
clothing on merchandise proper use).
12. See Tan, supra note 8, at 925 (citing Comedy III Productions, Inc., 21 P.3d at
809) (explaining relationship between transformative and creative representations
and right of publicity). In California, the transformative uses test is applied to
balance any conflicts between the right of publicity and free speech values. See id.
(describing test). The transformative uses test asks "whether the depiction or imi-
tation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question," (in
this instance, right of publicity prevails), or "whether a product containing a celeb-
rity's likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant's own
expression rather than the celebrity's likeness," (in this instance, the First Amend-
ment right to free speech prevails). See id. (quoting Comedy III Productions, Inc., 21
P.3d at 809).
13. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344 (d) (West 1997) (regulating use of identity for
public affairs). See Stephano v. News Grp. Publ'ns, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 184-86 (2d Cir.
1984) (discussing use of identity in news reporting). In Stephano, the New York
Court of Appeals ordered summary judgment for the defendant on the basis that
the plaintiff was unable to provide sufficient evidence "to raise ajury question as to
whether the article" published did not fall within the "newsworthiness exception"
to protection under sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. See id. at
174, 184 (stating holding of case and explaining "newsworthiness exception"). See
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing use of iden-
tity in biographical work). In Matthews, the court held that the publication of an
unauthorized biography of the plaintiff was not an infringement of the plaintiffs
rights of privacy or publicity. See id. at 432 (providing holding of case). See McCAR-
THY, supra note 1, at § 8:15 (discussing entertainment parody and satire).
14. See Caudill, supra note 9, at 264-66 (discussing categories of identity use).
15. See Alicia Del Valle, The "Governator" Bobblehead - An Exploration of the Right
of Publicity in California - an Interview with William T. Gallagher of Golden Gate Univer-
sity School of Law, 5 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 21, 21-30 (2005) (describing recent exam-
ple involving production and sale of bobblehead toys depicting California
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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focus on the right of publicity doctrine in New York and California
without further consideration of the demarcation between the four
categories. This paper will proceed on the basis that the uses dis-
cussed herein fall within either category one or two, and are prima
facie protected, subject to the scope of protection afforded under
the laws of New York and California.
B. Celebrity Identity
The right of publicity is concerned with unauthorized uses of
one's identity; however, the definition of identity varies from state
to state. 16 The "protectable aspects" of identity were originally re-
stricted to names or likenesses.17 However, protection is now af-
forded to a celebrity's photograph, portrait or picture, including
the use of mannequins and "look-alikes." 18 Protection also extends
to a celebrity's voice, including "sound-alikes," acts of entertain-
ment, personality or style of performance, catchphrases, objects, or
characters and roles synonymous with the celebrity.19
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger). Such uses could fall within any of the four
categories. See id. (noting sale of bobblehead falls within four categories). But see
ETW Corp. v Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 936-37 (6th Cir. 2003) (regarding
appropriate category of "use" for artistic representation of Tiger Woods).
16. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 132 (noting that, due to nature and scope
of publicity rights protection differing from state to state, advertisers who publish
or broadcast advertisements nationally across U.S. should ensure that they have
complied with states with broadest protection afforded to right of publicity).
17. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 77 (Ga. 1905) (dis-
cussing historical limitations of identity protections to misappropriation of name
and likeness).
18. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (describing publicity protec-
tion); N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS § 50-51 (McKinney 2009) (outlining publicity protection);
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d. 254, 263 (N.Y App. Div.
1983) (finding plaintiffs rights were misappropriated); Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc. &
Ors, 610 F. Supp. 612, 632-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Woody Allen") (ruling on motions
for summary judgment).
19. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (noting additional publicity
protection for categories); N.Y. Crv. RiGHTs § 50-51 (McKinney 2009) (describing
categories of publicity protection); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 464-65
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that defendants appropriated identity of famous singer to
sell defendants' product); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc, 978 F 2d 1093, 1093 (9th Cir.
1992) (ruling on suit of voice misappropriation under California law); Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 562 (1977) (regarding videotaping of
"human cannonball" act against performer's wishes); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane &
Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (discussing alleged
misappropriation of public personality); Carson & Ors v. Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983) (ruling on Johnny Carson's com-
plaint of alleged misuse of his phrase "Here's Johnny"); Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825-27 (9th Cir. 1974) (affirming "legal pro-
tection [of] an individual's proprietary interest in his own identity"); Price v. Hal
Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting protection
afforded to character role); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 603 P.2d 425, 428
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned protections, New York
law currently prevents unauthorized uses of a celebrity's "name,
portrait, picture, or voice" for advertising or trade purposes under
the New York Civil Rights Law.20 Conversely, California's right of
publicity affords protection to any identifiable aspect of a celebrity's
"identity."21 For the reasons set out herein, unauthorized uses of a
celebrity's identity should not be restricted to uses of name, por-
trait, picture, and voice. There are many identifiable aspects of a
celebrity's identity which do not fall within these four attributes-
for example, famous catchphrases. 22 The narrow protection af-
forded under New York law enables an advertiser to obtain a com-
mercial advantage by free-riding on the commercial value
associated with a particular celebrity, without receiving the celeb-
rity's consent or paying a fee to the celebrity. The approach taken
under California law should be preferred.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Interestingly, the right of publicity derived out of the right of
privacy. In 1890, two lawyers, Warren and Brandeis, wrote an arti-
cle entitled The Right to Privacy, in response to a disturbing trend
involving the media publishing private information about private
citizens.23 They acknowledged that certain "sacred precincts of pri-
vate and domestic life" were being invaded by instantaneous photo-
graphs and newspaper enterprise, and argued that the common law
(Cal. 1979) (establishing protection of character name and likeness); Groucho
Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 689 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1982) (affording
protection to character name and likeness); Groucho Marx Prods., Inc v. Day &
Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 485-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (illustrating example of pro-
tection of identity); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc, 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th
Cir. 1992) (providing example of "likeness"); Crasson, supra note 5, at 103-05 (ex-
plaining how right of publicity may be used to protect performer's character).
20. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw, §§ 50-51 (McKinney 2009) (defining right of
privacy).
21. See White, 971 F.2d at 1395 (relating scope of California law regarding
right of publicity).
22. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 831-32 (illustrating catchphrases do not fall within
limited restriction). In Carson, the plaintiff was a famous television host of "The
Tonight Show," and his identity was synonymous for the catchphrase "Here's
Johnny." See id. (describing relevance of plaintiffs attributes). The defendant
gave evidence to the court that it had used the phrase "Here's Johnny" because
"the public tends to associate the words with [the] plaintiff," and "absent that iden-
tification, [the defendant] would not have [used the catchphrase]." Id.
23. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REv. 193 (1890) (responding to media publishing private information).
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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should recognize a right of privacy to protect every person's "right
to be let alone" and "right to enjoy life."24
In 1902, in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 25 the plaintiff
brought an action against a flour manufacturer, claiming an in-
fringement on her right of privacy due to unauthorized printing,
sale and circulation of 25,000 lithograph prints of her person.26
The court summarized the plaintiffs complaint:
Such publicity . . . is to the plaintiff very distasteful, and
because of the defendant's impertinence in using her pic-
ture without her consent for business purposes, she has
[suffered] mental distress where others would have appre-
ciated the compliment to their beauty implied in the selec-
tion of the picture .... 27
The court refused to recognize a common law right of privacy, fear-
ful of opening the litigation floodgates.28 Roberson was met with "a
storm of public disapproval."2 9 In 1903, the New York legislature
enacted sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, over-
ruling Roberson and making it an offense and a tort to use a person's
"name, picture or photograph" in advertising or trade without his
or her consent.30
In 1905, and in contrast to Roberson, the Georgia Supreme
Court expressly recognized a common law right of privacy in
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. 31 In Pavesich, an insurance
company used the plaintiffs name and picture without his consent,
24. Id. at 193, 195.
25. 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902).
26. See id. at 442-43.(noting significant facts of case).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 447 ("An examination of the authorities leads us to the conclu-
sion that the so-called 'right of privacy' has not as yet found an abiding place in
our jurisprudence, and, as we view it, the doctrine cannot now be incorporated
without doing violence to settled principles of law by which the profession and the
public have long been guided."); see id. at 443 (explaining nature of right to pri-
vacy and how application of litigated principle would result in massive litigation,
sometimes bordering on absurd). The court stated that a common law "right of
privacy" "cannot be confined to the restraint of the publication of a likeness." Id. (emphasis
added).
29. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF L. REv. 383, 385 (1960) (recount-
ing reaction to court's decision in Roberson).
30. See Seth A. Dymond, So Many Entertainers, So Little Protection: New York, the
Right of Publicity, and the Need for Reciprocity, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 447, 451 (2003)
(describing state legislature's reaction to decision and subsequent enacting of law
to remedy issue).
31. See Pavesich v. New England Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 81 (Ga. 1905) (recogniz-
ing legal right to privacy and considering publication of individual's name and
picture without consent, accompanied by false testimony, to be invasion of right).
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to accompany a false testimony in advertising its life insurance
products. 32 In the judgment, Justice Cobb expressed disapproval of
Roberson, stating that the novel nature of the claim led to an "uncon-
scious yielding to the feeling of conservatism."3 3  Disagreement
among state courts ensued over whether to follow Roberson or
Pavesich; however, by the 1940s most agreed with Pavesich, recogniz-
ing a "right of privacy."34
A. Prosser's Four Torts of Privacy
Most early decisions considered whether or not to recognize
the right of privacy, rather than determining the scope of the inter-
ests to be protected. In his article entitled Privacy, Professor Prosser
considered that the right of privacy comprised four torts protecting
different interests:
(1) Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion/solitude;
(2) Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts;
(3) False light publicity; and
(4) Appropriating a plaintiff's name or likeness for commer-
cial advantage ("the appropriation tort").3
Despite the appropriation tort being classified under the privacy
doctrine, Prosser conceded that it protected "quite a different mat-
ter," because "[t]he interest protected is not so much a mental as a
proprietary one, in the exclusive use of the plaintiffs name and
likeness as an aspect of his identity."3 6 This was an early formula-
tion of the right of publicity.37
32. See id. at 79-80 (noting privacy rights infringed upon by insurance
company).
33. See id. at 78 (warning that conservatism "should not go to the extent of
refusing to recognize a right which the instincts of nature prove to exist, and which
nothing in judicial decision, legal history, or writings upon the law can be called to
demonstrate its non-existence as a legal right.").
34. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 1:18 (discussing level of recognition of
property rights by various states).
35. See Prosser, supra note 29, at 389 (listing four torts concerning invasion of
privacy).
36. Id. at 406. This difference between the interests protected by Prosser's
four torts was also noted by Judge Koelsch in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1974). Judge Koelsch noted that,
while the California courts consider the gist of privacy causes of action to be com-
pensation for injured feelings, the appropriation tort protects different interests.
See id. (distinguishing purpose of appropriation tort).
37. See Eastwood v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles Cnty., 149 Cal. App. 3d
409, 416 (2d Cir. 1983) (recognizing history of common law right to privacy and
related categories of invasion); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395,
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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B. Inadequacy of Privacy
Prosser's labeling of the appropriation tort as a subset of pri-
vacy, and his failure to specify whether it protected "injured feel-
ings" or commercial value, resulted in confusion when celebrities
began claiming violations of their privacy rights resulting from un-
authorized commercial uses of their identities.38 Nimmer discussed
the inappropriateness of celebrity reliance on the right of privacy:
"although the concept of privacy which Brandeis and Warren
evolved fulfilled the demands of Beacon Street . .. it may seriously
be doubted that [it] meets the needs of Broadway and
Hollywood."39
Nimmer noted a number of court decisions which considered
that celebrities, by virtue of their fame, had waived any rights of
privacy.40 Further, he considered that the right of privacy was de-
signed to prevent offensive publicity; in contrast, however often a
celebrity's identity was presented in a non-offensive manner, the ce-
lebrity's real grievance was damage to the "pocketbook."41 He also
observed that the right of privacy is a personal and non-assignable
right, whereas the publicity value of a celebrity's identity would be
severely restricted if the right to use his or her identity could not be
assigned or licensed.42
The plight of the celebrity-plaintiff was highlighted in Gautier
v. Pro-Football, Inc.4 3 In finding no violation of the New York Civil
Rights Law, Justice Desmond stated:
1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing common law right of publicity); McCARTHY, supra
note 2, at § 1:7 (discussing common law history and right of publicity).
38. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, at §§ 1:7, 1:23 (explaining appropriation tort
and its relationship to privacy interests).
39. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 203,
203 (1954).
40. See id. at 204 (discussing celebrity rights of privacy).
41. See id. at 206-09 (noting right of privacy intended to protect against "offen-
sive" publicity); see McCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 1:7 (noting that celebrity's real
grievance is lack of payment).
42. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 209 (discussing source of value of celebrity's
identity).
43. See Gautier v Pro-Football, Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 487 (N.Y. 1952) (discuss-
ing facts of case and contract relationship). In Gautier, a renowned animal trainer
conducted a performance during the half time period of a professional football
game before 35,000 persons, pursuant to a contract with the defendant, the owner
of the Washington Redskins football team. See id. (stating facts of case). The con-
tract provided that the plaintiffs act would not be televised without his prior writ-
ten consent, however, it was shown as part of the telecast. See id. (relating terms of
contract). The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was not afforded
protection under sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. See id. at
489 (holding that breach of contract did not give rise to cause of action under
statute).
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My difficulty is that there was no invasion of any 'right of
privacy.' [The] Plaintiff, a professional entertainer, gave
his show before a vast audience in an athletic stadium. His
grievance here is not the invasion of his 'privacy' - privacy
is the one thing he did not want, or need, in his occupa-
tion. His real complaint ... is that he was not paid for the
telecasting of his show. 4 4
C. Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.
In 1953 in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., the
plaintiff, a chewing gum manufacturer, obtained exclusive contrac-
tual rights to use a baseball player's photograph on its chewing gum
products.45 The defendant, a rival manufacturer, induced the same
player into authorizing the defendant to use his photograph on its
rival products.46 The plaintiff sued the defendant, claiming induce-
ment of breach of contract, and was unsuccessful at trial. 47 On ap-
peal, the defendant argued that there was no actionable wrong
because the baseball player had merely agreed to release the defen-
dant from what would otherwise be an infringement of sections 50
and 51.48 The defendant contended that no person has a legally
assignable interest in the publication of his picture.4 9
Judge Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared
the existence of a common law right of publicity, stating that "in
addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in New
York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value
of his photograph, for example, the right to grant the exclusive
privilege of publishing his picture . . ."SO Judge Frank recognized
that the right was designed to protect the commercial interests of
"prominent persons," declaring it:
[C]ommon knowledge that many prominent persons ...
would feel deprived if they no longer received money-for
authorizing advertisements, popularizing their counte-
nances, displaying in newspapers, magazines, busses,
trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually
44. Id. at 489.
45. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d
Cir. 1953) (illustrating rights of chewing gum manufacturer).
46. See id. (noting conflict of interest between competing manufacturers).
47. See id. at 866 (holding plaintiff did not have claim for inducement of
breach of contract).
48. See id. at 867 (presenting defense for actions of defendant manufacturer).
49. See id. at 868 (discussing lack of assignable interest).
50. Id.
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yield them no money unless it could be made the subject
of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser
from using their pictures.5'
Haelan has been credited with creating the right of publicity as a
distinct doctrine separate from the right of privacy.52 Judge Frank
expressly recognized the different objects underlying protection of
privacy and publicity values, noting the real grievance for famous
persons was to affect control over unauthorized uses of their pic-
tures, rather than to pursue compensation for "bruised feelings."53
Further, Haelan declared the right, proprietary in nature, may be
assigned and licensed, thereby enabling celebrities to assign their
publicity rights for valuable consideration. 5 4
Twenty state courts have subsequently followed Haelan and rec-
ognized a common law right of publicity, and eight of those states
concurrently recognize a statutory right of publicity.55 Another ten
states have privacy statutes which protect publicity rights. 5 6 Only
two states have rejected a common law right of publicity.57 The
first, Nebraska, was overruled by statute.5 8 The other is New York,
the very state where Haelan was decided.59
51. Id.
52. See McCarthy, supra note 1, at 131 (introducing relevant right of publicity
principles and origins of its distinction from right of privacy); Hanifan, supra note
2, at 295 ("The first case recognizing a right of publicity was Haelan Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc."). Cf Nimmer, supra note 39, at 218 (citing several
cases for proposition that, before Haelan, there existed "judicial willingness to ex-
tend protection to publicity values" not ordinarily protected under existing
doctrines).
53. See Haelan Labs., Inc., 202 F.2d at 867 (clarifying goals of right of
publicity).
54. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 222 (noting that Haelan case held that right
of publicity is "property right which may be validly assigned").
55. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 6:3 (noting that states that have recog-
nized common law right of publicity are Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecti-
cut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin). The states that recognize a statutory right of pub-
licity are California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Wisconsin. See id. (relating states which provide statutory right of publicity).
56. See id. (listing states as Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New
York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington).
57. See id. (explaining in Nebraska and New York, "a court expressly rejected
the concept and held that a common law right of publicity does not exist in that
state").
58. See id. (explaining Nebraska's stance on right of publicity); see also Carson
v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce Trust & Say., 501 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir. 1974)
(rejecting right of publicity).
59. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 6:3 (noting New York's rejection of com-
mon law right of privacy and subsequent adoption of privacy statute).
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IV. NEW YORK
Following Haelan, it was thought that New York law recognized
a separate common law right of publicity, independent of the statu-
tory right of privacy.60 However, great uncertainty surrounded the
precedential value of Haelan.61 While the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and other state courts applied Haelan, New York
state courts were inconsistent on the issue.62 Haelan represented
"the federal court's interpretation and application of New York law,
which is . .. not binding in other jurisdictions . . . [or] New York
courts."63
In Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., the plaintiff, known
as "Mr. New Years Eve," sued a car manufacturer claiming unautho-
rized use of his "likeness and representation" in advertising. 64 The
defendant employed an actor to use the same gestures, manner-
isms, and music with which the plaintiff was synonymous.65 The
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court agreed with the
plaintiff, finding a violation of his common law right of publicity.6 6
The court declined protection under sections 50 and 51 because
the defendant had not used his "name, portrait or picture," even
though the defendant had appropriated his "personality or style of
performance," which were "legitimate [protectable] proprietary in-
terest[s]."67 A similar result was reached in Groucho Marx Produc-
tions, Inc., & Ors v. Day & Night Co., Inc.68
In Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., the New York Supreme
Court unanimously affirmed an earlier summary judgment for the
defendant, dismissing the plaintiffs right of publicity claim, be-
cause "[n]o such . .. right has yet been recognized by New York
60. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d
Cir. 1953) (recognizing right of publicity).
61. See Nimmer, supra note 39, at 222 (stating Haelan case provides questiona-
ble precedential weight).
62. See id. (contending that application of Haelan should be limited to its
facts).
63. Id.
64. See Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665-66
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (stating facts of case).
65. See id. (explaining purpose of defendant's actor).
66. See id. (explaining that celebrity has interest in his public personality, and
mimicking certain aspects of celebrity's public persona could lead to exploitation
of "that carefully and painstakingly built public personality").
67. See id. (stating court's holding).
68. See Groucho Marx Prods. Inc., & Ors v. Day & Night Co., Inc., 689 F.2d
317, 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting lower court's holding that defendants "exploited
their rights of publicity" in their self-created characters and therefore those rights
are properly asserted here).
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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State Courts."69 Finally in Brinkley v. Casablancas, the plaintiff, a fa-
mous model, brought a publicity rights claim for the alleged unau-
thorized use of her photographs. 70 The court held that, because
sections 50 and 51 do not distinguish between the private person
claiming injured feelings and the celebrity whose economic inter-
ests have been exploited, ". . . the so-called right of publicity is sub-
sumed in sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law."71
A. Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc.
In 1984, in Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc.,72 the New
York Court of Appeals unequivocally declared that New York does
not recognize a distinct common law right of publicity.7 3 In
Stephano, the plaintiff was a model who agreed to be photographed
for New York Magazine.74 One photograph appeared in the August
31, 1981 issue of the magazine, and two additional photographs ap-
peared in the September 7, 1981 issue of the magazine. 75 The
plaintiff sued the defendant alleging violations of sections 50 and
51, and his common law right of publicity, because the defendant
had used photographs in the August 31, 1981 issue without his
consent.76
The court held that New York does not recognize a distinct
common law right of publicity because that right is subsumed
within sections 50 and 51.7 The court noted that, although the
statute was enacted to overrule Roberson and intended to protect
69. Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 768 (N.Y. App. Div.
1980). It may be possible to distinguish Frosch on the basis that the claim for "right
of publicity" infringement was based on a publication about the deceased, which
the court deemed to be of public interest, thereby protected by the First Amend-
ment right of free speech. See id. (noting extenuating circumstances of public in-
terest). The court stated, "[t]he protection of the right of free expression is so
important that we should not extend any right of publicity, if such exists, to give
rise to a cause of action against the publication of a literary work about the de-
ceased person." Id.
70. See Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 429 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (not-
ing that plaintiffs claim was in regard to poster bearing plaintiffs photograph).
71. See id. at 439 (explaining reasoning of court).
72. 64 N.Y.2d 174 (N.Y. 1984).
73. See id. at 183 (finding no common law right of publicity claim exists be-
cause New York Civil Rights Law encompasses right of publicity claims).
74. See id. at 179-80 (discussing plaintiffs profession and photography session
with magazine).
75. See id. at 179 (discussing magazine issues that led to claim in case).
76. See id. at 180 (discussing plaintiffs agreement to model for only one
issue).
77. See id. at 182-83 (addressing non-existence of common law right of public-
ity and existence of such right only under statute).
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injured feelings, the express words of sections 50 and 51 captured
any unauthorized uses of a person's "name, picture or portrait" in
advertising or trade, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs grievance
was commercial or not.78
As a result of Stephano, New York does not recognize a common
law right of publicity; instead, New York provides only limited pro-
tection to prevent the unauthorized use of a person's "name, por-
trait, picture and voice" for advertising or trade purposes under
sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law.79 "Voice" was
78. See id. (citing Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443-48
(N.Y. 1902)) (discussing statutory history of right to privacy in New York and its
effect on right of publicity claims).
79. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 50 (McKinney 2009) ("A person, firm or corpo-
ration that uses for advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name,
portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained the written
consent of such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.").
Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice is used within this state
for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written
consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable ac-
tion in the supreme court of this state against the person, firm or corpo-
ration so using his name, portrait, picture or voice, to prevent and
restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any
injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have
knowingly used such person's name, portrait, picture or voice in such
manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by section fifty of this
article, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages. But
nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any
person, firm or corporation from selling or otherwise transferring any
material containing such name, portrait, picture or voice in whatever me-
dium to any user of such name, portrait, picture or voice, or to any third
party for sale or transfer directly or indirectly to such a user, for use in a
manner lawful under this article; nothing contained in this article shall
be so construed as to prevent any person, firm or corporation, practicing
the profession of photography, from exhibiting in or about his or its es-
tablishment specimens of the work of such establishment, unless the
same is continued by such person, firm or corporation after written no-
tice objecting thereto has been given by the person portrayed; and noth-
ing contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any
person, firm or corporation from using the name, portrait, picture or
voice of any manufacturer or dealer in connection with the goods, wares
and merchandise manufactured, produced or dealt in by him which he
has sold or disposed of with such name, portrait, picture or voice used in
connection therewith; or from using the name, portrait, picture or voice
of any author, composer or artist in connection with his literary, musical
or artistic productions which he has sold or disposed of with such name,
portrait, picture or voice used in connection therewith. Nothing con-
tained in this section shall be construed to prohibit the copyright owner
of a sound recording from disposing of, dealing in, licensing or selling
that sound recording to any party, if the right to dispose of, deal in, li-
cense or sell such sound recording has been conferred by contract or
other written document by such living person or the holder of such right.
Nothing contained in the foregoing sentence shall be deemed to abro-
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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added to the protected list in 1995.80
B. Name
Some New York state and federal courts have adopted a narrow
construction of "name.""' In Pfaudler v. Pfaudler Co., the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court held that name consti-
tutes an individual's full name, because it is only through an indi-
vidual's full name that he or she is identifiable.82 Other cases have
decided that name does not encompass a person's nickname, stage-
name, penname, or any unique name belonging to an unknown
plaintiff.83
The aforementioned cases contradict judicial and academic au-
thority that an unauthorized use of a person's name, broadly inter-
preted, will amount to a violation of his right of publicity, provided
the plaintiff is identifiable by such name.84 Prosser stated that "a
stage or other fictitious name can be so identified with the plaintiff
that he is entitled to protection against its use."85 In Hirsch v. S.C.
Johnson 6f Son, the plaintiff was a famous gridiron player whose
nickname was "Crazylegs."8 6 The Wisconsin Supreme Court re-
gate or otherwise limit any rights or remedies otherwise conferred by fed-
eral law or state law.
Id. § 51.
80. See Dymond, supra note 30, at 451 (explaining various aspects of New York
statute).
81. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 4:58 (describing various interpretations
of name by state and federal courts).
82. See Pfaudler v. Pfaudler Co., 186 N.Y.S. 725, 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920)
(interpreting name in reference to statute).
83. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 4:58 (referencing cases that interpret
name to exclude nicknames); Davis v. R.K0 Pictures, 16 F. Supp. 195, 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1936) (holding "[s]ections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law do not
apply to any assumed or "stage name" of the plaintiff ... [hier only legal name is
Claire H. Davis, the name she signed to the complaint, and that is the only name
for which she can claim protection under the provisions of the Civil Rights Law.");
Geisel v. Poynter Prods., 295 F. Supp. 331, 356 (S.D.N.Y 1968) (finding "the name
'Dr. Seuss' is an assumed name or pseudonym rather than a surname and is, there-
fore, not a protectable 'name' within the meaning of Section 51 of the New York
Civil Rights Law."); Nebb v. Bell Syndicate, 41 F. Supp. 929, 930 (S.D.N.Y 1941)
(concluding that defendant comic strip publishers who described one of their ficti-
tious characters as "Rudy Nebb" had never heard of plaintiff Rudy Nebb who re-
sided in Georgia, had no intention of referring to this person, and using same
name as plaintiff, absent knowledge and intention, was not sufficient to violate
sections 50 and 51).
84. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 4:58 (noting that "identifiable" requires
at least minimum threshold of recognition among public who might see defen-
dant's usage).
85. Prosser, supra note 29, at 404.
86. See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, 280 N.W.2d 129, 130 (1979) (describing
plaintiff).
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manded the matter back to a jury to determine whether the defen-
dant's use of the name Crazylegs infringed the plaintiff's right of
publicity, and noted that: " [t] he fact that the name 'Crazylegs' used
byJohnson, was a nickname rather than Hirsch's actual name, does
not preclude a cause of action. All that is required is that the name
clearly identify the wronged person . . . ."87 Finally, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, in the Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co.
("Aunt Jemima"), stated in obiter that a public or stage-name may
constitute a person's name if it is "closely and widely identified"
with the plaintiff.8 8
C. Portrait and Picture
The interpretation of "portrait or picture" has been "somewhat
flexible."89 It is not limited to an actual photograph and can in-
clude "clearly recognizable paintings or cartoons" of a person.90 In
Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc., the New York Supreme Court held
that a mannequin, made in the plaintiffs likeness, may constitute a
portrait or picture:
The words 'picture' and 'portrait' are broad enough to in-
clude any representation . . . . The use of a three-dimen-
sional representation is just as violative of the statute as
that of a two-dimensional one . . . the word 'portrait' in-
cludes .. . a carved or molded figure, a statue, a sculpture,
a visible representation or likeness; an image; a copy ... 91
The use of a "look-alike" can constitute a portrait or picture.
In the Woody Allen case, the plaintiff, a famous actor, sued multiple
parties claiming infringements of sections 50 and 51, his right of
publicity, and the Lanham Act prohibition of misleading advertis-
ing, from an alleged appropriation of his face and implication of
his endorsement of the defendant's products by use of a look-alike
87. Id. at 137.
88. See Gardella v. Log Cabin Prods. Co. ("Aunt Jemima"), 89 F.2d 891, 894 (2d
Cir. 1937) (addressing protection of stage names).
89. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the
Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1199, 1213 (1986).
90. Allen v. Nat'1 Video, Inc. ("Woody Allen"), 610 F. Supp. 612, 622 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); see also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (stating
that "portrait or picture" extends beyond photographs to standard of "representa-
tions which are recognizable as likenesses").
91. Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc., 26 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (N.Y. App. Div.
1941).
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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actor.92 Although the court failed to determine the look-alike issue,
the court found for the plaintiff on the Lanham Act claim.93 The
court cited with approval, however, Onassis v. Christian Dior-New
York, Inc., for the proposition that a look-alike can constitute a por-
trait or picture where the "overall impression created clearly was
the plaintiff had herself appeared in the advertisement."9 4
One notable, albeit questionable, limit on what constitutes a
"portrait or picture" derives from the recent decision in Burck v.
Mars, Inc.95 The plaintiff was a street entertainer who performed in
Times Square as the "Naked Cowboy," wearing only a white cowboy
hat, cowboy boots and underwear, and carrying a "strategically
placed" guitar.96 The plaintiff had registered trademarks to "The
Naked Cowboy" name and likeness.97 The plaintiff sued the con-
fectionary company, claiming infringements of his right of publicity
and the Lanham Act false endorsement provisions, arising from
animated advertisements playing in Times Square depicting a blue
M&M dressed "exactly like The Naked Cowboy."98 Judge Chin dis-
missed the plaintiffs privacy claim, noting that the statute protects
the "name, portrait and picture of a living person," and does not
protect a "character created or a role performed by a living per-
son."99 Judge Chin stated that, while portrait or picture can include
actual photographs and "any recognizable likeness . . . no viewer
would have thought that the M&M Cowboy characters were actually
[the plaintiff] or were intended to be him."100 Judge Chin also
noted that merely evoking certain aspects of a character or role
does not infringe sections 50 and 51.101 Curiously, while the court
acknowledged the Woody Allen decision, which noted that a "clearly
recognizable painting or cartoon . . . drawing or [mannequin]"
would certainly constitute a portrait or picture, the court found that
the advertisement at issue depicted a fictional character played by
92. See Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 617 (relating causes of action brought by plaintiff
against defendants).
93. See id. at 624-25 (reasoning that Lanham Act analysis properly addresses
facts of case).
94. Id. at 623-24 (citing Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d
254, 261-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)).
95. See Burck v. Mars, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 2d 446, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (dis-
missing plaintiffs right to privacy claim but not false endorsement claim).
96. See id. at 448 (describing plaintiffs act and costume).
97. See id. (noting plaintiff possessed trademarks).
98. Id. (emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 448-49.
100. Id. at 451-52.
101. See id. at 452-53 (discussing sections 50 and 51 of New York Civil Rights
Law).
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the plaintiff, and therefore was not protected under sections 50 and
51.102
D. Voice
Prior to 1995, the court in Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing
Co., 0 3 held that sections 50 and 51 did not prevent misappropria-
tions of a person's voice. 10 4 Following legislative amendment in
1995, protection under sections 50 and 51 was extended to unau-
thorized uses of a person's voice.' 05 It remains to be seen, however,
whether voice will encompass "sound-alikes."I0 6
V. CALIFORNIA
California courts were originally hostile towards Haelan.'0 7 In
1974, with Motschenbacher v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co.,' 08 the Ninth
102. See id. at 452 (quoting Allen v. Nat'l Video Inc. ("Woody Allen"), 610
F.Supp. 612, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)) (discussing what constitutes "clearly
recognizable").
103. 737 F Supp 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
104. See id. at 837 (involving copyright infringement, false designation of ori-
gin, unfair competition claims brought by rap group against beer manufacturer).
105. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 6:84 (discussing 1995 legislative
amendments).
106. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F 2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that California's statutory right of publicity is not violated by use of sound-alike).
In Midler, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, for the purposes of section
3344 of the California Civil Code, a person's right of publicity is not violated by the
use of a sound-alike, although use of a sound-alike was held to violate California's
expansive right of publicity at common law. See id. (stating that Midler did not
have a claim under section 3344, but could seek damages under common law).
Such a determination may be persuasive on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
its future interpretation of sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law.
But see Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc, No. 96 Civ. 9289 (LAP), 1998 WL 267920, at 1637
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1998) (discussing earlier motions). The court noted its earlier
granting of the defendants' motion, in respect of the plaintiffs claim of evoking an
association with plaintiffs style of voice. See id. at 1638 (rejecting cause of action
under look-alike theory and then Civil Rights Law). There, the court noted that
"[t]o the extent that the commercial may evoke an association with Gilberto or the
style of Gilberto through the use of the recording of her voice, such association or
evocation is not actionable under the Civil Rights Law." Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
No. 96 Civ. 9289, 1997 WL 324042, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1997). The author
therefore considers that it may be inferred from the judgment that, had the New
York Civil Rights Law previously included voice as a protectable aspect of one's
identity, it may have been inclined to recognize that voice encompassed sound-
alikes.
107. SeeJohn R. Braatz, White v. Samsung Electronics America: The Ninth Circuit
Turns a New Letter in California Right of Publicity Law, 15 PACE L. REv. 161, 174
(1994) (explaining Ninth Circuit's position); Strickler v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 167 F
Supp 68, 70 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (emphasizing court's reticence in "blaz[ing] the trail
to establish in California a cause of action based upon the right of publicity.").
108. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Circuit Court of Appeals first indicated that California would pro-
tect "an individual's proprietary interest in his own identity."109
In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,'10 the plaintiffs alleged that the
use of an image of their deceased father, an actor who played the
lead role in the movie Dracula, was licensed without their consent,
by the defendant."' The court found for the defendant on the
basis that no post-mortem right of publicity exists; however, the
court conceded that, during his lifetime, the deceased had the right
to exploit his name and likeness for commercial gain.'12
Finally, in Eastwood v. Superior Court,'"3 the California Court of
Appeals recognized a right of publicity under California's common
law to prevent unauthorized uses of identity for advantage.114 In
Eastwood, the court held that the defendant tabloid magazine pro-
prietor had used the plaintiffs name, photograph and likeness
without his consent, to attract consumer attention, in violation of
the plaintiffs common law and statutory right of publicity." 5
A plaintiff who alleges violation of his or her common law right
of publicity must establish the following four elements:
1. The alleged defendant used his or her identity;
2. The appropriation of the plaintiffs identity to the defen-
dant's advantage;
3. The lack of consent from the plaintiff; and
4. Resulting injury.'16
109. Id. at 825. In recognizing such proprietary interests ought to be pro-
tected, the court noted various cases where "commercial aspect[s]" of one's iden-
tity have been protected either under Prosser's "appropriation tort" or a distinct
right of publicity, however, the court declined to determine which approach Cali-
fornia should adopt to protect these interests. See id. (discussing various cases pro-
viding protection of commercial aspects of individual's identity).
110. 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
111. See id. at 427 (explaining basis for plaintiffs' cause of action).
112. See id. at 430-31 (characterizing right to exploit name and likeness as
"personal one" that does not flow to immediate ancestors upon death).
113. 149 Cal. App. 2d 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
114. See id. at 417 (specifying elements required to make out cause of action
for appropriation of name or likeness).
115. See id. at 420-21 (noting tabloid violated both statutory and common law
in exploiting plaintiffs name, photograph, and likeness).
116. See id. at 417 (providing list of elements). Cf White v. Samsung Elec.
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming elements required to
ground right of publicity cause of action). In Eastwood, the court held that the
second element was "[t] he appropriation of the plaintiffs name or likeness for the
defendant's advantage." Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 2d at 417. In contrast, the court
in White held that the right of publicity at common law is not confined to uses of
one's name or likeness, but more broadly, to uses of one's identity. White, 971 F.2d
at 1397-99. Furthermore, the second element of the right of publicity at common
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The statutory right of publicity contained in section 3344 of
the California Civil Code requires two additional elements:
5. Knowing use of the plaintiffs identity for advertising or so-
licitation of purchases; and
6. Direct connection between the use and the commercial
purpose.117
The aspects of one's identity protectable under section 3344 are
"name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness."118 Consequently,
the statutory protection afforded in California is broader than that
afforded by sections 50 and 51 of the New York statute.
However, it is the protection afforded under California's right
of publicity at common law which is decidedly more expansive. In
Motschenbacher, an internationally known car racer, notorious for his
cars which displayed distinctive stripes and the number "11," sued a
tobacco company for unauthorized use of a photograph of the
plaintiffs car, which had been altered to display the number "71"
instead of "11."119 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
an earlier determination that the driver of car "71" was not identifi-
able with the plaintiff: "these markings were not only peculiar to
the plaintiffs cars but they caused some persons to think the car in
question was [the] plaintiffs and to infer that the person driving
the car was the plaintiff."120 Here, the plaintiffs identity was
evoked by the defendant through the use of photographs of the
plaintiffs distinctive racecars, which had become "signs or symbols
associated with him" and synonymous with his personality. 121
law affords broader protection than under the statute, because the former requires
appropriation of the plaintiffs identity for the defendant's "advantage," whether
commercial or otherwise, whereas section 3344(a) requires appropriation for com-
mercial purposes only, that is, for the purposes of advertising or selling, or solicit-
ing purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services. See id. (discussing
scope of common law).
117. See Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. at 417 (presenting additional elements of stat-
utory right to privacy); see also CA. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997) (explaining
knowledge requirement); CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344(e) (West 1997) (requiring com-
mercial use to be actionable).
118. CA. Civ. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997). See also CA. CIV. CODE §3344(b)
(West 1997) ("'[P]hotograph' means any photograph or photographic reproduc-
tion, still or moving, or any videotape or live television transmission, of any person,
such that the person is readily identifiable.").
119. SeeMotschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822 (9th
Cir. 1974) (relating facts of case).
120. Id. at 827.
121. Id.
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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The case of Midler v. Ford Motor Co. 1 2 2 involved a plaintiff who
was a famous actress and singer with many successful songs, includ-
ing "Do You Want to Dance."123 The defendant contacted the
plaintiffs agent and proposed that the plaintiff appear in the de-
fendant's commercial, but the plaintiffs agent declined.124 Subse-
quently, another musician was employed to sing "Do You Want To
Dance" in the commercial with instructions to "sound as much as
possible like . .. Bette Midler."125 The plaintiff claimed that section
3344 and her common law right of publicity had been infringed. 126
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, while section 3344
did not provide any protection to the plaintiff because her voice
was not used in the commercial, the defendants used a sound-alike
to "convey the impression that Midler was singing for them," and
"[a] voice is distinctive and more personal than the automobile ac-
couterments protected in Motschenbacher... [and] as distinctive and
personal as a face."127 The court held that the defendants imper-
sonated the plaintiffs voice to "pirate her identity" to their advan-
tage and therefore infringed her common law right of publicity.128
The decision in Midler was approved and followed in Waits v. Fito-
Lay, Inc.,129 where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an
earlier jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor.130 There, the defendant's
radio commercial featured a vocal performer imitating the plain-
tiff's distinctively raspy singing voice.' 3
Finally the decision in White v. Samsung Electronics America was
said to have "greatly expanded the scope of California's common
law right of publicity . . . where both the bench and bar will be
unsure of its boundaries."13 2 The plaintiff in that case was the fe-
male hostess of "Wheel of Fortune," a game show which boasted
122. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
123. See id. at 461 (discussing identity of plaintiff).
124. See id. (recounting request made by defendant to plaintiff, which plain-
tiff refused).
125. Id.
126. See id. at 463 (recounting plaintiffs cause of action).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
130. See id. 1112 (upholding jury verdict and holding voice misappropriation
and Lanham Act claims to be legally sufficient).
131. See id. at 1097 (noting plaintiff's unique raspy voice recognized by fans).
The advertising agency that created the commercial for the defendant chose one
of the plaintiffs songs and searched for a singer to imitate his voice. See id. (dis-
cussing defendant's apprehension to release commercial in fear of potential legal
repercussions).
132. Braatz, supra note 107, at 163, 221.
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forty million daily viewers.13 3 The plaintiff had blonde hair, and
wore distinctively large jewelry and a long gown.134 The defendant
featured a robot in its television commercial, in which the robot
donned a blond wig, gown and jewelry, posing in front of a "Wheel
of Fortune" style game board with a caption reading "longest-run-
ning game show."135 The plaintiff alleged infringements of her stat-
utory and common law right of publicity, and false endorsement
under the Lanham Act.' 36 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held the grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the sec-
tion 3344 claim, but found that the District Court erred in granting
the defendant's summary judgment on the other two grounds.13 7
The court held that how one's identity was misappropriated is not as
important as whether it had been misappropriated.13 8 In an analysis
which has received some criticism, the court recognized that an ap-
propriation of one's identity can occur, not only when there is an
actual use of identity, but when a celebrity's identity has been
evoked: "[t]he identities of the most popular celebrities are not
only the most attractive for advertisers, but also the easiest to evoke
without resorting to obvious means such as name, likeness, or voice."' 39 In
declaring such expansive publicity rights protection, the court
noted that a right of publicity which guards against a "laundry list of
specific means of appropriating identity" encourages the "clever ad-
vertising strategist" to be inventive in appropriating a celebrity's
identity.140
133. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir.
1992) (discussing popularity of plaintiffs game show).
134. See Vanna Style, SoNy PicrREs, http://www.vannastyle.com/ (last visited
Apr. 4, 2012) (displaying plaintiffs physical features and weekly show attire).
135. White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
136. See id. (reciting plaintiffs claims).
137. See id. at 1397, 1399, 1401 (holding robot at issue was not plaintiff's like-
ness, but plaintiff had potential right of publicity and Lanham Act claims).
138. See id. at 1398 (concluding right of publicity does not require misappro-
priation to be accomplished though particular means, only that specific means
show whether defendant actually appropriated plaintiffs identity).
139. Id. at 1399 (emphasis added). Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals criticized the White decision, stating that it "erects a property right of
remarkable and dangerous breadth . . . it's now a tort for advertisers to remind the
public of a celebrity. Not to use a celebrity's name, voice, signature or likeness; not
to imply the celebrity endorses a product; but simply to evoke the celebrity's image
in the public's mind." White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th
Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original).
140. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992).
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VI. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROTECTION
To evaluate the different approaches taken in California and
New York, the key justifications for the right of publicity should be
examined.
A. Locke Labor Theory
The Locke Labor Theory posits that every celebrity achieved
his or her fame through hard labor, time, and effort and is there-
fore entitled to the fruits of his or her labor.141 "Though the Earth,
and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has
a Property in his own Persona. This no Body has any Right to But
himself."142 In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the existence of Ohio's com-
mon law right of publicity, emphasizing the "right of the individual
to reap the reward of his endeavors."145 In Lombardo, the court ac-
knowledged the plaintiffs proprietary interest in his persona be-
cause "[he had] invested 40 years in developing his personality as
Mr. New Years Eve."14 4 Likewise, ChiefJustice Bird in Lugosi recog-
nized that "[y] ears of labor may be required before one's skill, rep-
utation, notoriety or virtues are sufficiently developed to permit an
economic return."145
The theory assumes that any commercial value associated with
a celebrity's identity results from that person's labor. There is no
doubt that various celebrities have contributed significantly to their
"star power." Bette Midler won three Grammy Awards and was
nominated for two Academy Awards in recognition of her singing
and acting talents.14 6 Frank Sinatra won numerous Academy
Awards, Golden Globes and Emmy Awards, while Elvis Presley won
three Grammys and sold approximately one billion records world-
141. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 175 (1993) (connecting theories ofJohn Locke
to publicity right jurisprudence); see also Tan, supra note 8, at 928-32 (2008) (dis-
cussing general applicability of Lockean theory).
142. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 27 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1964) (1690).
143. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977) (an-
alyzing individual's right to prevent unauthorized broadcasts of individual's act or
performance).
144. Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977).
145. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 438 (Cal. 1979).
146. See Sinead Garvan, Bette Midler: I Wouldn't Make It Now, BBC (Nov. 26,
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-11842187 (relating inter-
view with Bette Midler).
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wide.14 7 MichaelJordan andJoe Montana undoubtedly derive their
star power from leading their respective teams to numerous cham-
pionships with MVP performances.14 8
While the courts have long recognized the commercial value
that attaches to a celebrity's identity, some have questioned
whether such value results from a celebrity's labor, and thus
whether he or she is entitled to reap the rewards.149 The Locke
Labor Theory ignores the influence of various sectors in contribut-
ing to, fostering, and cultivating "celebrity personality."15 0 Once
upon a time, individuals became famous through feats of excel-
lence: A man's name was not apt to become a household word un-
less he exemplified greatness in some way or another. He might be
a Napoleon, great in power, a J.P. Morgan, great in wealth, a St.
Francis, great in virtue, or a Bluebeard, great in evil.15 1 Presently it
is naive to suggest that celebrity fame derives solely from one's own
labor. Fame can result from "luck, serendipitous involvement in
public affairs, or criminal conduct," and participation in reality tele-
147. See Frank Sinatra's Awards & Achievements, SINATRA.COM, http://www.sina-
tra.com/content/frank-sinatras-awards-achievements (last visited Apr. 4, 2012)
(listing awards and achievements of Frank Sinatra); Overview of Achievements, ELvis
.com, http://www.elvis.com/about-the-king/achievements.aspx (last visited Apr. 4,
2012) (discussing awards and achievements of Elvis Presley).
148. See Praise From his Peers: NBA's 50 Greatest Sing MJ's Praises, SPORTS ILLUS-
TRATED (Feb. 1, 1999), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/nba/1999/
jordan-retires/news/1999/01/13/jordangreatest/ (listing comments by various
athletes and sports analysts praising Michael Jordan's career); Top 10 Clutch
Quarterbacks of All Time, SI.com, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/multimedia/
photo-gallery/0608/gallery.NFLclutchqbs/content.10.html (last visited Apr. 4,
2012) (providing photograph of Joe Montana and summary of his career).
Michael Jordan is a six-time NBA championship player and a six time finals MVP
winner. See Encyclopedia Playoff Edition, NBA.com, http://www.nba.com/history/
players/jordan-bio.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) (discussing Michael Jordan's
career). Joe Montana is a four-time Super Bowl champion and a three-time Super
Bowl MVP winner. See Joe Montana, PROFOOTBALLHOF.com, http://www.profoot
ballhof.com/hof/member.aspx?playerjid=154 (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) (discuss-
ing Joe Montana's career).
149. See Madow, supra note 141, at 160-62 (discussing relationship between
celebrities and their fans); Tan, supra note 8, at 931 ("It is obvious that the courts
recognize that the identity of a celebrity can have a significant economic value that
ought to be protected.").
150. See Rosina Zapparoni, Propertising Identity: Understanding the United States'
Right of Publicity and Its Implications - Some Lessons for Australia, 28 MELB. U. L. REv.
690, 719-20 (2004) (deconstructing Lockean Labor Theory).
151. DANIELJ. BOORSTIN, THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA
46 (1961).
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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vision shows.152 A celebrity is simply a "person who is known for his
well-knownness."15 3
While Sinatra, Elvis, and Jordan may have strong claims to pub-
licity rights protection based on Locke Labor Theory, it is difficult
to mount "feats of excellence" arguments in favor of, for example,
Kim Kardashian or Nicole "Snooki" Polizzi, both of whom substan-
tially derive their fame from reality television shows.1 54 Likewise
Paris Hilton, once described as a "well-bred daughter of the
Hollywood Hills famous for, well, who knows really . . ."155 The
cases of Kardashian, Snooki, and Hilton can be better explained by
Tan.156 Tan considered that celebrity personality is formulated, fos-
tered, and cultivated by a trinity of persons: the celebrity, the gen-
eral population, responsible for conferring fame, recognition,
endorsement and goodwill on the celebrity, and celebrity "produc-
ers," including advertising agencies, brand consultants, talent man-
agement and public relations firms.157 The value of such producers
was noted by Boorstin: Shakespeare . . . divided great men into
three classes: those born great, those who achieved greatness, and
those who had greatness thrust upon them. It never occurred to
him to mention those who hired public relations experts and press
secretaries to make themselves look great.'58 Lord Hoffmann re-
cently acknowledged the role played by producers:
152. Fred M. Weiler, The Right of Publicity Gone Wrong: A Case for Pivileged
Appropriation of Identity, 13 CARDOzo ARTS & EN. L. J. 223, 241 (1994).
153. See BOORSTIN, supra note 151, at 57 (defining celebrity).
154. See About Me, NICOLE SNooIa Pouzzi, http://www.snookinicole.com/
Snooki/ABOUT.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) (discussing Snooki's background);
see also Kim Kardashian Bio, Kim KARDASHLAN, http://kimkardashian.celebuzz.com/
bio/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2012) (recounting Kim Kardashian's personal and profes-
sional background). Interestingly Kim Kardashian initiated proceedings against
Old Navy, a clothing company, alleging a violation of her publicity rights through
the use of a look-alike in its advertisements, and she evoked Locke Labor Theory
justifications in support of her claim; she asserted that she has "invested substantial
time, energy, finances and entrepreneurial effort in developing her considerable
professional and commercial achievements and success, as well as in developing
her popularity, fame and prominence in the public eye." Anthony McCartney, Kim
Kardashian Sues Old Navy Over Lookalike In Ads, USA TODAY (Jul. 21, 2011), available
at http://www.usatoday.com/money/advertising/2011-07-21-kim-kardashian-old-
navy-n.htm.
155. See Laura Streib, The 10 Highest-Earning Reality Stars, DAILY BEAST (Dec 5,
2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/12/06/the-10-highest-earn-
ing-reality-television-stars.html (discussing Paris Hilton's background); see generally
Hanifan, supra note 2 (explaining Paris Hilton's suit against Hallmark alleging a
violation of her right of publicity because Hallmark used the slogan, "That's Hot").
156. See Tan, supra note 8, at 916-17 (explaining phenomenon of fame).
157. See id. (outlining parts of "trinity").
158. BooRSTIN, supra note 151, at 45.
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Naomi Campbell is a famous fashion model who lives by
publicity. What she has to sell is herself: her public ap-
pearance and her personality. She employs public rela-
tions agents to present her personal life to the media in
the best possible light just as she employs professionals to
advise her on dress and make-up.159
Furthermore, the courts have recognized the significant role
the public plays in fostering celebrity status, by recognizing and at-
tributing good will to a celebrity.' 6 0 Decker noted that fame is a
"relational phenomenon" which correlates "in large part to the au-
dience's needs, interests, and purposes. A person's talents alone
cannot make her famous . ".. ."161 If one accepts that celebrity status
derives from the trinity of persons, it follows that Locke Labor The-
ory, as ajustification for protecting publicity rights, is unconvincing
and fails to yield persuasive reasoning.
B. Economic Incentive
Another commonly cited justification is the "economic incen-
tive" rationale, which underpins copyright, trademark, and patent
law. This rationale states that affording protection to publicity
rights induces and encourages people to invest time, effort, and re-
sources to produce works or products that benefit society.' 62
Ricketson and Richardson noted the Report on Intellectual and
Industrial Property prepared by the Economic Council of Canada,
which provided that "[patents, copyrights, trademarks and regis-
tered industrial designs] are . . . incentive devices, designed to elicit
more of certain kinds of 'learning' or knowledge creation and cer-
tain kinds of knowledge processing."163 When applied to the right
of publicity, Chief Justice Bird in Lugosi stated that: "[p] roviding
159. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [37] (appeal taken from
Eng.) (discussing producer's importance in context of Naomi Campbell).
160. See Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (D. Minn. 1970)
(discussing importance of public perception in creating celebrity status). The
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota noted that a celebrity's
name is "commercially valuable as an endorsement of a product or for financial
gain only because the public recognizes it and attributes good will and feats of skill
or accomplishments of one sort or another to that personality." Id.
161. Michael Decker, Goodbye Norma Jean: Marilyn Monroe and the Right of Pub-
licity's Transformation at Death, 27 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 243, 258 (2009) (dis-
cussing multiple factors involved in development of fame).
162. See Madow, supra note 141, at 206 (setting forth principles of economic
incentive argument).
163. SAM RICKETSON & MEGAN RICHARDSON, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. CASES,
MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 11 (3d ed., 2005) (citing EcoNOMic COUNCIL OF CA-
NADA, REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 31 (1971)).
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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legal protection for the economic value in one's identity against
unauthorized commercial exploitation creates a powerful incentive
for expending time and resources to develop the skills or achieve-
ments prerequisite to public recognition . . . ."164 In Zacchini, the
court acknowledged that Ohio's right of publicity "provides an eco-
nomic incentive . . . to make the investment required to produce a
performance of interest to the public."' 65
There is no doubt that the financial benefits associated with
celebrity status can be substantial. For example, in the early 1990s,
then-NBA rookie Allen Iverson signed a fifty million dollar endorse-
ment contract with Reebok, compared with his three-year 9.2 mil-
lion dollar playing contract, and NBA star Grant Hill signed an
eighty million dollar endorsement contract with Fila, to accompany
his forty-five million dollar playing contract.166 In 2003, then-high
school basketball player LeBron James, yet to play an NBA game,
signed an endorsement contract with Nike worth ninety million
dollars.167
Despite the aforementioned figures, numerous commentators
question whether the right of publicity will lead to a public benefit
from increased creativity or accomplishments in entertainment or
sport.168 Clay argued that the economic incentive rationale wrong-
fully presumes that the "carrot" of the endorsement contract pro-
vides incentive for sporting or entertainment greatness.169 The
economic incentive rationale "completely ignore [s] the primary re-
wards gained by one who has become famous and to set up the
collateral rewards as the primary motivation." 17 0 Madow supports
164. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, Inc, 603 P.2d 425, 441 (Cal. 1979) (discuss-
ing economic value of one's identity).
165. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (noting
economic incentive associated with right of publicity).
166. See GARY WAY, FEET FIRST: THE ANATOMY OF AN ATHLETIC SHOE ENDORSE-
MENT DEAL, IN FOOTBALL: RISING TO THE CHALLENGE 311-13 (Geoffrey Scott ed.,
2006)) (relating substantial athletic-shoe endorsement contracts of NBA players).
167. See Seth Stevenson, Heir jordon: Will Nike's $90 Million Gamble Pay Off?,
SLATE (May 22, 2003, 5:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2083478/ (detailing
amount of LeBron James's endorsement deal with Nike).
168. See Steven C. Clay, Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in
State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REv. 485, 505-06 (1994-95) (arguing against
economic incentive presumption that endorsements provide incentive for athletic
greatness); Tan, supra note 8, at 934 (recognizing considerable support for eco-
nomic incentive for enterprise, creativity, and achievement from right of public-
ity); see also Madow, supra note 141, at 207-13 (arguing that economic incentive
effect of right of publicity is very slight).
169. See Clay, supra note 168, at 505-06 (holding that Economic Incentive ar-
gument fails in real world).
170. Id. at 505.
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this view, noting that the primary activities that create fame, includ-
ing starring in a movie or playing professional sport, provide sub-
stantial payoffs: "will Quarterback Brown give up professional
football and his multimillion dollar salary if others are free to use
his picture on posters or T-shirts without paying him for the privi-
lege? Not likely."171
Moreover, the right of publicity originated at a time when en-
tertainers and sporting athletes were poorly paid for their trades
and therefore, "a desire to maintain incentives for creativity might
easily have justified a right of publicity."172 This is no longer the
case. For example, the stars of hit reality television show, 'Jersey
Shore," receive $100,000 per episode.173 It goes without saying that
this represents a significant pay packet for eight otherwise ordinary
people, whose famed exploits include working out at the gym, tan-
ning, and doing laundry ("GTL") by day, and excessive drinking
and clubbing by night. 74 Therefore, while the right of publicity
was arguably justified under the economic incentive rationale when
financial rewards for sporting or entertainment endeavors were triv-
ial, it is not persuasive in the modern era where financial rewards
for sporting or entertainment activities are significant in and of
themselves.
C. Unjust Enrichment
The third, and most compelling, justification in favor of the
right of publicity is the "unjust enrichment" rationale. This ratio-
nale has been described as: "the straightforward one of preventing
unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is
served by having the defendant get for free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would nor-
mally pay."175 This rationale proclaims that it is morally reprehensi-
171. Madow, supra note 141, at 209-10.
172. Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, But He Shouldn't Be: The Right of Publicity Re-
visited, 138 BYU L. REv. 597, 625 (1992).
173. See Jersey Shore Stars Secure $100,000 an Episode, HERALD SUN (Apr. 11,
2011, 1:19 PM), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/entertainment/tv-radio/jersey-
shore-stars-100000-an-episode-deal/story-e6frf9ho-1226037215025 (explaining cast
members of show "Jersey Shore" earn $100,000 per episode).
174. See Carry on Camping: TheJersey Shore Cast Leave GTL Behind To Embrace The
Great Outdoors, DAILY MAIL (July 29, 2011, 9:22 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tv
showbiz/article-2019993/The-Jersey-Shore-cast-leave-GTL-embrace-great-outdoors-
camping-trip.html (detailing cast's routine behaviors during most recent season of
"Jersey Shore").
175. See Harry Kalven,Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?,
31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 326, 331 (1966) (citing "unjust enrichment" as compel-
ling justification for right of publicity).
[Vol. 19: p. 481
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ble for a defendant to exploit for advantage the commercial value
associated with a celebrity, when the defendant played no role in
contributing to the creation of such value.176 In Onassis, Justice
Greenfield relied on the unjust enrichment justification when stat-
ing, "there is no free ride. The commercial hitchhiker seeking to
travel on the fame of another will have to learn to pay the fare or
stand on his own two feet."177 Similarly, Judge Noonan, in Midler,
cited with approval the comments contained in the earlier judg-
ment of the district court, where the court described the defend-
ants' conduct, in hiring a Bette Midler sound-alike, as akin to the
"average thief," noting that "if [they] can't buy it, [they will] take
it."178
However, similar to Locke Labor Theory, the unjust enrich-
ment justification tends to imply that the celebrity is responsible for
the creation of his or her own commercial value, downplaying the
role played by the trinity of persons. 79 Such criticisms were consid-
ered and persuasively dismissed by Halpern.180 Halpern noted that,
irrespective of who is ultimately responsible for producing a celeb-
rity's "economically exploitable fame," the existence of such value is
undeniable:
The phenomenon of celebrity generates commercial
value. A celebrity's persona confers an associative value,
or economic impact, upon the marketability of a product.
Whether we like commercialization of personality or not,
the economic reality persists. Consumers are prepared to
pay for Elvis Presley tee shirts; they pay for a Presley like-
ness, not simply for a garment. In that sense the Presley
persona's 'value' is demonstrably present, irrespective of
whether a court determines that the vendor must or need
not pay the Presley estate [for the right to use Presley's
image].181
176. See Tan, supra note 8, at 932 (explaining thrust of unjust enrichment
rationale when defendant attempts to exploit commercial value associated with
celebrity).
177. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 261 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984).
178. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).
179. See Decker, supra note 161, at 260 (illustrating that celebrity is responsi-
ble for creation of celebrity's own commercial value under unjust enrichmentjusti-
fication); Tan, supra note 8, at 934-35 (highlighting idea that celebrity is
responsible for celebrity's own commercial value).
180. See Halpern, supra note 5, at 871-72 (explaining Halpern's rejection of
criticisms of unjust enrichment rationale).
181. Halpern, supra note 89, at 1243.
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In Midler, the court emphatically noted the commercial value asso-
ciated with Midler's identity, of which the defendants attempted to
take advantage:
Why did the defendants ask Midler to sing if her voice was
not of value to them? Why did they studiously acquire the
services of a sound-alike and instruct her to imitate Midler
if Midler's voice was not of value to them? What they
sought was an attribute of Midler's identity. Its value was
what the market would have paid for Midler to have sung
the commercial in person.' 8 2
Halpern argued that, if one accepts that a celebrity's identity carries
with it a commercial value, the appropriate question is not whether
the celebrity "deserves the benefits of celebrity," but rather whose
interests should be protected; the celebrity who contributed some-
thing to the creation of his or her own fame, or the defendant who
contributed nothing to the celebrity's fame and who seeks to exploit
such value to its own advantage.'8 3 In this scenario, the defendant
is properly seen as a "scavenger trading on the ephemera of
fame."184
The use of celebrity identity acts to transfer the associative
value of the celebrity's identity to the product being sold, thereby
attaching that celebrity's good will to that product. This is a valua-
ble right for which consideration should be paid, and absent con-
sideration, compensation through right of publicity protection.
For the aforementioned reasons, the unjust enrichment ratio-
nale persuasively supports an expansive right of publicity to prevent
free-riding, thereby focusing on the behavior of the defendant.
This view was shared by Tan: "[t] he proper inquiry should be fo-
cused on whether the predominant purpose of the defendant is to
exploit the economic associative value of the celebrity without pay-
ing an appropriate fee."' 85 If the preceding arguments are ac-
cepted, it follows that New York's right of publicity protection is
inadequate and the Californian approach should be preferred.
182. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
183. See Halpern, supra note 5, at 871-72 (noting celebrity is not sole creator
of his or her image).
184. Id.
185. Tan, supra note 8, at 982.
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D. The Entertainment Industry
A further justification in support of a strong right of publicity
derives from the economic and social importance of the entertain-
ment industries to the states of New York and California.'"6 As
Dymond stated, New York and California are synonymous with en-
tertainment: "New York [is] home to Broadway, Carnegie Hall and
Radio City Music Hall. California [is] home to Hollywood and the
Walk of Fame . . . [California and New York] comprise the en-
tertainment capitals of the United States."' 87
With respect to New York, the entertainment industry is "an
integral part of [its] economy."' 88 It helps to create jobs for local
workers, generates commerce for local businesses, contributes to lo-
cal and state taxes, and affects the level of tourism and invest-
ment.189 In 2005, the arts industry contributed $25.7 billion to New
York's economy, generated 194,000 jobs, $9.8 billion in wages, and
$1.2 billion in New York state taxes.' 90 Of those figures, the motion
picture and television industry was responsible for contributing
$8.4 billion, generating 58,000 jobs, $3.7 billion in wages, and $359
million in state taxes.'91 By 2010, New York's motion picture and
television industry had experienced considerable growth, generat-
ing 86,768 jobs and $7.7 billion in wages.192 During the 2009 to
2010 financial year, 279 films and 345 TV projects were filmed in
186. See Dymond, supra note 30, at 474 (describing importance of entertain-
ment industries to New York and California)
187. Id. at 447.
188. See Rosemary Scanlon & Catherine Lanier, Arts as an Industry: Their Eco-
nomic Impact on New York City and New York State, ALLANCE FOR THE ARTS, 5 (2006)
available at http://www.allianceforarts.org/get-the-facts/current-reports.php
[hereinafter Alliance for the Arts] (describing economic role art industry plays in
City and State of New York).
189. See id. ("The arts invest in local economies by hiring a local workforce,
engaging local businesses and paying local and state taxes. Beyond that contribu-
tion . .. arts-motivated visitors [is] one of the strongest components of New York's
growing tourism market.").
190. See id. at 7-8 (comprising motion picture and television sector, art gal-
leries and auction houses, commercial theatre, arts-motivated visitors, and non-
profit culture). The author notes that this report does not take into consideration
the economic impact of the sports industry, which may be considered part of a
broader "entertainment" industry.
191. See id. at 13 (describing impact of film and television industries on New
York State's economy in 2005).
192. See State-by-State Film & Television Economic Contribution, MOTION PIcrURE
Ass'N OF Am., http://www.mpaa.org/policy/state-by-state (last visited Apr. 4, 2012)
(detailing impact of industry on New York, recent productions there, and produc-
tion incentives offered by state).
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New York.19 3 In addition to the motion picture industry, the com-
mercial theatre industry, including Broadway and off-Broadway pro-
ductions, contributed $2.2 billion to New York's economy, created
15,450 jobs, paid $815 million in wages, and generated $79 million
in taxes.194
California's motion picture and television industry also con-
tributes significantly to the state's economy.195 In 2010, it was re-
sponsible for generating 193,220 jobs, including actors, producers,
writers, and directors, as well as "ancillary services" such as hair-
dressers and make-up artists, lighting, sound, and camera crews and
caterers, and $16 billion in wages. 196 In 2010, 273 films and 254 TV
series were filmed in California.'9 7
In addition to the aforementioned economic impact, a large
number of entertainers reside within New York and California. 98
In 2003, Los Angeles was home to approximately 44,500 entertain-
ers, while New York City had approximately 38,900 resident enter-
tainers.199 As Judge Nelson noted in Sinatra v. National Enquirer,
Inc.,200 "California has an overriding interest in safeguarding its citi-
zens from the diminution in value of their names and likenesses,
enhanced by California's status as the center of the entertainment
193. See id. (noting total numbers of recent film and television projects filmed
in New York).
194. See Alliance for the Arts, supra note 188, at 17 (explaining economic ef-
fects of commercial theater on New York State in 2005).
195. See Kevin Klowden, Anusuya Chatterjee, & Candice Flor Hynek, Film
Flight: Lost Production and Its Economic Impact on California, MHEN INST., 7 (Jul.
2010), available at http://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/wordpress/wp-content/
uploads/2010/08/FilmFlight52.pdf (emphasizing profound economic impact of
entertainment industry, and film and television industries in particular, on
California).
196. See id. (listing wide variety of careers film and television industries sup-
port); State-by-State Film & Television Economic Contribution, MOTION PICrURE Ass'N
OF AM., http://www.mpaa.org/policy/state-by-state (last visited Apr. 15, 2012)
(stating job and wage numbers for motion picture and television industries, cover-
ing production and distribution sides).
197. See State-by-State Film & Television Economic Contribution, MOTION PIcrURE
Ass'N OF AM., http://www.mpaa.org/policy/state-by-state (last visited Apr. 15,
2012) (enumerating key projects that began filming in state in 2010).
198. See Dymond, supra note 30, at 472 (comparing number of entertainers in
Los Angeles and New York City, nationally number one and two respectively, to
number in smaller city); see also State-by-State Film & Television Economic Contribution,
MOTION PIcrURE Ass'N OF AM., http://www.mpaa.org/policy/state-by-state (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 2012) (showing entertainmentjob statistics for all states and dispropor-
tionate amount in New York and California).
199. See Dymond, supra note 30, at 472 (totaling number of resident enter-
tainers based on membership in largest union and guild locals).
200. 854 F. 2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1988).
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industry."201 Given the economic impact of the entertainment in-
dustries on the state economies of New York and California, and
the fact that right of publicity actions are ordinarily filed in the state
where the celebrity resides, there are weighty justifications in favor
of each state affording strong protection to celebrities, and their
publicity rights, to encourage and foster further growth and devel-
opment of the respective entertainment industries. 202
E. Summary on Justifications
While the Locke Labor Theory and economic incentive ratio-
nale lack persuasive reasoning, the unjust enrichment rationale,
combined with the economic importance of the entertainment in-
dustries in New York and California, provide compelling arguments
justifying expansive protection of the right of publicity. For these
reasons, the broad protection afforded under California's right of
publicity should be preferred to the limited protection offered in
New York.
VII. CRITIQUE
New York law occupies a "unique and special case in the history
of the common law right of publicity," because the right originated
out of the jurisprudence of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals;
however, it received a "hostile reception" and eventual rejection by
the court in Stephano.203 New York does not recognize a common
law right of publicity, and provides limited protection against unau-
thorized uses of a person's "name, portrait, picture and voice" for
advertising or trade purposes provided under sections 50 and 51 of
201. Id. at 1202.
202. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518 (9th Cir.
1993) (KozinskiJ., dissenting) ("A right of publicity created by one state applies to
conduct everywhere, so long as it involves a celebrity domiciled in that state. If a
Wyoming resident creates an ad that features a California domiciliary's name or
likeness, he'll be subject to California right of publicity law even if he's careful to
keep the ad from being shown in California."). See also Bartz, supra note 1, at 303
(noting "a right of publicity action is properly filed in the state where the celebrity
resides"); Groucho-Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 485, 487
(2d Cir. 1985) (holding that issue of which state's law governs dispute was decided,
in part, due to all defendants being resident of New York). Cf Hoepker v. Kruger,
200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that protection under Civil
Rights Law is afforded to both residents and non-residents of New York state).
203. See McCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 6:74 (describing basis for New York's
rejection of common law right of publicity); Stephano v. News Group Publ'ns., 64
N.Y.2d 174, 183, 182-83 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting outright "independent common-
law right of publicity" in New York). For further discussion of Stephano, see supra
notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
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New York's privacy statute. 204 However, as the court noted in
Onassis:
There are many aspects of identity. A person may be
known not only by objective indicia - name, face, and so-
cial security number, but by other characteristics as well -
voice, movement, style, coiffure, typical phrases, as well as
by his or her history and accomplishments. Thus far, the
legislature has accorded protection only to those aspects
of identity embodied in name and face.205
Many unauthorized appropriations of identity are deemed law-
ful under sections 50 and 51.206 In Lombardo, the court held that
the defendant had not used the plaintiff's "name, portrait or pic-
ture," but determined that it had nonetheless appropriated his
"personality or style of performance."2 0 7 As the law currently
stands, these aspects of identity are not protectable in New York,
because they do not fall within the exhaustive list contained in sec-
tions 50 and 51. Moreover, the misappropriation of identity consid-
ered in Carson & Ors v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets20s would not
infringe sections 50 and 51.209 In Carson, the plaintiff was a famous
host of "The Tonight Show," synonymous with the introduction
"Here's Johnny."210 He sued the defendant, a corporation who en-
gaged in trade and commerce as a supplier of "Here's Johnny" port-
able toilets, claiming unfair competition, trademark infringement
and invasion of his privacy and publicity rights. 2 1 1 The defendant's
president admitted to the court that he had used the phrase
"Here's Johnny," because "the public tends to associate the words
... with [the] plaintiff," and "absent that identification, he would
204. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 50 (McKinney 2009); see also McCARTHY, supra
note 1, at § 6.81 (highlighting New York's statute-based definition).
205. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 261 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984).
206. See McCARTHY, supra note 2, at §§ 6:87-6:92 (identifying examples of con-
duct not covered by New York statute).
207. Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664-65 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1977).
208. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
209. See id. at 837 (recognizing that, had company used plaintiffs name, but
not his celebrity identity, there would be no violation).
210. See id. at 832 (explaining that phrase "Here's Johnny" was "generally as-
sociated with [ohnny] Carson by a substantial segment of the television viewing
public").
211. See id. at 832-33 (describing cause of action).
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not have chosen it."212 The court determined that the defendant
had violated the plaintiffs right of publicity.2 13 This is an example
of a defendant who admittedly appropriated the plaintiff's identity;
however, this conduct would not be captured by sections 50 and 51.
For these reasons, the current state of New York law enables a
defendant to free-ride off many aspects of a celebrity's identity for
advantage, and tends to ignore the subjective intentions of the de-
fendant in using a celebrity's identity. Moreover, despite the re-
marks of the court in Stephano, that the words contained in sections
50 and 51 are sufficiently broad to protect commercial interests or-
dinarily protectable under the right of publicity, there remains a
longstanding recognition of the doctrinal inadequacy of the right
of privacy in protecting publicity interests.214 Finally, given the im-
portance of the entertainment industry to the state of New York,
and the inherent need to afford protection to its entertainers, seri-
ous consideration ought be given to providing a greater level of
protection, and in particular, to provide comparable protection to
that offered under California law. The restricted protection af-
forded in New York, compared with California, means that, when
looking at the entertainment industry, California-based celebrities
are afforded a greater level of protection of their publicity rights
than celebrities residing in New York.215 "New York, as a hub for
entertainers, does not allow celebrities to sufficiently protect their
identities and personas from commercial exploitation."2 16
In stark contrast to New York, various decisions of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have expanded California's common
law right of publicity to protect against unauthorized uses of spe-
cific aspects of one's identity; for example, name, face and voice, as
well as "mere evocations" of a celebrity's identity, which are not re-
stricted to an exhaustive list of indicia, provided the appropriation
212. See id. at 836 (explaining defendant's motivation for choosing company
name).
213. See id. at 837 (maintaining that plaintiffs identity was intentionally ap-
propriated for commercial purposes).
214. See Stephano v. News Group Publ'ns., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 182-83 (2d Cir.
1984) (explaining that statute is not limited to non-commercial purposes); see also
Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 359 (2d Cir. 1952) (stating that mere
use of name in informational context is not precluded without some connection to
advertising purposes). For a further discussion of Gautier, particularly the com-
ments of Justice Desmond, see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
215. See Sinatra v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F. 2d 1191, 1202 (9th Cir. 1988)
(describing protection of celebrity identity in California).
216. Dymond, supra note 30, at 448.
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or evocation was for advantage. 217 "The growth of the right of pub-
licity has been nowhere more apparent than in California, the pre-
dominant home of film, television, and music celebrities." 2 1 8
California's position has received some criticism. Judge Kozin-
ski, dissenting from the order rejecting a rehearing en banc, stated
that the White decision:
[E]rects a property right of remarkable and dangerous
breadth . . . it's now a tort for advertisers to remind the
public of a celebrity. Not to use a celebrity's name, voice,
signature or likeness; not to imply the celebrity endorses a
product; but simply to evoke the celebrity's image in the
public's mind. 219
According to Judge Kozinski, where an advertiser merely reminds
the public of an aspect of a celebrity's identity, this may violate his
or her publicity rights. 2 2 0 Such a violation can be accomplished
without a "realistic rendering" of the celebrity.221 Some commenta-
tors further note the difficulty in determining what constitutes a
celebrity's identity.2 2 2 In determining whether an individual's iden-
tity has been appropriated, the courts apply the "identifiability" test,
asking whether "more than a de minimus number of ordinary view-
ers identify the [celebrity] by looking at (or listening to) the defen-
217. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th
Cir. 1974) (finding misappropriation of plaintiffs identity because automobile
markings caused persons to believe automobile belonged to plaintiff, and was
driven by plaintiff); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988)
(upholding plaintiffs tort claim for unauthorized used of sound-alike voice);
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding
"that the common law right of publicity reaches means of appropriation other
than name or likeness" and "the specific means of appropriation are relevant only
for determining whether the defendant has in fact appropriated the plaintiffs
identity"). In White, CircuitJudge Goodwin held that "[t]he identities of the most
popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but also the
easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as name, likeness, or
voice." Id. at1399. This has since been referred to as the "evocation of identity"
test. See Weiler, supra note 152, at 258; Clay, supra note 168, at 497-98.
218. Bartz, supra note 1, at 300.
219. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993).
220. See Weiler, supra note 152, at 258 (explaining that identifiability triggers
liability); see also Clay, supra note 168, at 497-98 (indicating that touchstone of right
of publicity violation is evocation of plaintiffs image for commercial purposes).
221. See Weiler, supra note 152, at 259-60 (illustrating right of publicity viola-
tion where public is reminded of plaintiff celebrity); see also Clay, supra note 168, at
497-98 (requiring only that evocation somehow remind audience of plaintiff).
222. See David Tan, Much Ado About Evocation: A Cultural Analysis of "Well-
Knownness" and the Right of Publicity, 28 CARDOzo ARTS & Ewr. L.J. 317, 320 (2010)
(noting that each state has its own definition of identity).
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dant's advertisement."2 23 Despite the law's constant efforts to
promote certainty, however, efforts should not be made to define
the outer limits of what constitutes a celebrity's identity. To do so
would be counter-intuitive to the purpose of preventing unautho-
rized uses of one's identity for advantage. As the court noted in
White-
Motschenbacher, Midler, and Carson teach the impossibility
of treating the right of publicity as guarding only against a
laundry list of specific means of appropriating identity. A
rule which says that the right of publicity can be infringed
only through the use of nine different methods of appro-
priating identity merely challenges the clever advertising
strategist to come up with the tenth. 224
The law should, at its optimum level, remain as flexible as possible
to- prevent the clever, free-riding advertiser from obtaining the ben-
efits of using a celebrity's identity without obtaining the celebrity's
consent, or paying an appropriate fee.
Moreover, it has been said that the evocation of identity test
fails to define the extent to which a celebrity's identity must be
evoked before it amounts to a publicity rights violation. 225 Weiler
considered a hypothetical scenario: instead of a car manufacturer
engaging a Better Midler sound-alike singer and instructing her to
"sound as much as possible . . . like Bette Midler" when singing "Do
You Want To Dance" in its advertisement, the manufacturer en-
gages a male singer who sounds nothing like Bette Midler.226 Wei-
ler considered that, by applying White, the public would be
reminded of Midler when the male sings this song, and this would
violate Midler's right of publicity, absent her consent.227
However, Weiler has seemingly extrapolated the White evoca-
tion of identity test beyond the limits intended by the court. In
White, the court was satisfied that the plaintiffs identity had been
evoked, because the individual aspects of the advertisement "leave
223. McCarthy, supra note 3, at 135.
224. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F. 2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992).
225. See Tan, supra note 222, at 324 (commenting on lack of clarity in deter-
mining extent of use of identity that constitutes publicity rights violation).
226. Weiler, supra note 152, at 259 (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988)) (presenting different facts to demonstrate an alternate
outcome).
227. See id. (arguing that Midler's publicity claim would preclude advertisers
from using any version of song associated with Midler without first obtaining her
consent).
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little doubt about the celebrity the ad is meant to depict."2 2 8 The
court further considered that Michael Jordan's identity would be
evoked if a hypothetical advertisement featured a robot with male
features, of African-American complexion and a bald head, sport-
ing a red basketball uniform with the number "23" on it, dunking a
basketball with the signature one-handed, split leg action.229 Ac-
cording to Judge Goodwin, "any sports viewer who has registered a
discernible pulse in the past five years would reach [the conclusion
that]: . . . the ad is about Michael Jordan."so
McCarthy made it clear that unauthorized use of any indicia of
a person's identity can infringe the right of publicity, if the indicia
"are so closely and uniquely associated with the identity of a particu-
lar individual that their use enables the defendant to appropriate
the commercial value of the person's identity."23' Therefore, con-
trary to Judge Kozinski's views, in order to violate a person's public-
ity rights, it is not sufficient to "merely remind . . . or vaguely to
conjure up" a celebrity's identity.23 2 What is required is an unequiv-
ocal identification with the plaintiff, that is, "so closely and
uniquely" associated with the celebrity's identity to allow an appro-
priation of that person's publicity value.2 33
For these reasons, the scope of the evocation of identity test
pronounced by Weiler appears to be flawed. In fact, it is difficult to
fathom how an advertisement featuring a male singing a song made
famous by Bette Midler would lead the public to believe that the
advertisement is about Bette Midler, although it may very well re-
mind the public of her.
For the aforementioned reasons, the protection afforded to
publicity rights in New York is inadequate and insufficient, and ef-
forts should be made, either legislatively or by revisiting the posi-
tion at common law, to overrule Stephano and follow the approach
taken under California's expansive common law right of publicity.
For the avoidance of doubt, the following approach should be
adopted in New York:
228. White, 971 F. 2d at 1399.
229. See id. (examining hypothetical facts under evocation of identity test).
230. Id.
231. Halpern, supra note 5, at 863-64 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 46 (1995)).
232. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993).
See also Halpern, supra note 5, at 863-64 (discussing what constitutes violation of
person's right of publicity).
233. See Halpern, supra note 5, at 863-64 (explaining requirement for viola-
tion of right of publicity).
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1. The courts should focus on whether a celebrity's identity has
been appropriated without his or her consent, rather than
how it was appropriated;234
2. "Identity" should not be limited to a celebrity's "name, por-
trait, picture and voice" but rather should encompass any
identifiable aspects of a celebrity's identity, using the iden-
tifiability test;235 and
3. The White evocation of identity test should be adopted, pro-
vided the indicia of identity used are "so closely and
uniquely associated with the identity of [the celebrity] that
their use enables the defendant to appropriate the commer-
cial value of the [celebrity's] identity."2 36
VIII. CONCLUSION
The states of California and New York adopt markedly differ-
ent levels of protection to celebrity's right of publicity. As the law
currently stands, New York law prevents any unauthorized uses of a
celebrity's "name, portrait, picture and voice" for advertising or
trade purposes, and does not recognize a separate right of publicity
at common law. 237 There are a number of different means by
which a celebrity's identity can be appropriated other than by using
a person's "name, portrait, picture and voice," thereby enabling the
"clever advertising strategist" to free-ride on the commercial value
associated with a celebrity's identity without being required to seek
that celebrity's consent. 238
The approach taken by the California courts, which focuses on
whether a celebrity's identity has been appropriated, rather than how
it was appropriated, should be preferred and adopted by New
York.2 39 Moreover, the definition of what constitutes a celebrity's
identity should not be limited to a celebrity's "name, portrait, pic-
ture and voice" but expanded to capture any identifiable aspects of
a celebrity's identity under the identifiability test. 2 4 0 Finally, the ev-
234. See White, 971 F. 2d at 1398 (stating "[i]t is not important how the defen-
dant has appropriated the plaintiffs identity, but whether the defendant has done
so") (emphasis in original).
235. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 135 (explaining identifiability test).
236. Halpern, supra note 5, at 863-64 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 46 (1995)).
237. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 132-134 (explaining that New York has no
common law of privacy).
238. See White, 971 F. 2d at 1398 (explaining that there are several creative
ways to circumvent rules of publicity).
239. See id. (describing California approach).
240. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 135 (explaining identifiability test).
HeinOnline  -- 19 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 519 2012
40
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss2/3
520 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouRNAL [Vol. 19: p. 481
ocation of identity test enunciated in the White decision should be
adopted, provided the indicia of identity used are "so closely and
uniquely associated with the identity of [the celebrity] that the use
enables the defendant to appropriate the commercial value of the
[celebrity's] identity."241 The adoption of these principles, either
legislatively or at common law, would enable a consistent level of
protection to be afforded to entertainers, irrespective of whether
they reside in New York or California.
241. Halpern, supra note 5, at 863-64 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 46 (1995)).
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